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POLITICS AND DENIAL
PierreSchlag*
Here are three things that make Duncan Kennedy's work so
insightful to some yet so infuriating to others:
First, he refuses to accord respect to what legal academics
take most seriously about law. He is resolutely antimonumentalist.
When he's done discussing some momentous legal issue, it turns
out that the conflicting arguments are organized around a couple
of "plausible moves." It's disarming.
Second, Kennedy is resolutely infrastructural. This puts him
at odds with virtually all legal theorists who try to provide
comprehensive accounts of their subject matter. Their mantra is:
"encompass and subsume." Kennedy's is: "burrow and infiltrate."1
They overarch. He undermines. Kennedy will, at times, claim to
be a structuralist, but it is always a peculiar kind of structuralismungrounded, floating, nonfoundational.
Third, Kennedy has an absolute horror of reification-most
particularly the reification of his own thought. Indeed, Kennedy
strives valiantly to subvert the reification of his own thinking.
Reading his work, it is hard to avoid the sense that he prefers
motion to stasis, verbs to nouns, Sartre to Ldvi-Strauss,
engagement to theory, contradiction to coherence and, most
topically, politics to law.
All of this is to say that A Critique of Adjudication: Fin de
Si&ce 2 ("Critique") is not a conventional work. It's not so much a
theory of adjudication as it is a. sustained exploration of
adjudication from a series of designedly discordant perspectives.
Of the many possible entries into the work, I have chosen politics
and denial.
I. POLITICS
As a group, cls people have never quite agreed on what they
meant by "politics." If one goes through the literature, "politics"
* Pierre Schlag, Byron White Professor of Constitutional Law, University of Colorado
School of Law; B.A. 1975, Yale; J.D. 1978, UCLA.
I Hence, the worm at the heart of being, the tale of the two bad mice, the virus.
2 See DUNCAN KENNEDY,A CRITIQUE OF ADJUDICATION: FIN DE SItCLE (1997)
[hereinafter CRITIQUE].
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turns out to a highly protean notion-a rhetorical umbrella for a
variety of different conceptions, including politics as value choice,
power, ideology, interest group struggle, power/knowledge, and
class warfare.
I was told recently that the undertheorization of "politics" in
cls was, in part, an attempt to avoid the "manifesto syndrome"
common to the American left. In this syndrome, tenets of political
positions are proposed, discussed, adopted-whereupon four-fifths
of the people in attendance promptly leave the room, never to be
heard from again.
Whatever the strategic merits of leaving the term "politics"
relatively underspecified, it did present some problems. For those
of us on the margins of cls, it was always a bit frustrating not to
know just what cls thinkers meant by "politics," or how much of a
hold cls thinkers believed "politics" might have on, or in, law. It
was also a bit frustrating not to know what cls thinkers meant by
"law." (In fairness, this did not distinguish cls from other schools
of thought at the time-all of which got off their particular dime
by bravely pretending that everyone knew what that particular
word (law) meant.)
Some cls understandings of "politics" were so transparently
modest as to seem utterly beyond contention-hence, for instance,
the notion that "doctrine" can be, and is, in fact, pushed around by
policies or value judgments. The same might be said of the notion
that when judges decide cases, they must inevitably-at least in
cases they care about-make value choices.
Other understandings, i.e., the view that law consists of
political struggles carried on by awkward means, seemed plausible
in certain areas of law. In fields like labor law, abortion, race
discrimination, landlord-tenant, there seemed to be an almost
"perfect fit" between the political and legal terminology. In other
areas of law, the legal terminology did not coincide exactly with
the political terminology but was "close enough"-states' rights
for instance, often served as a vehicle for discriminatory racial
policies. But then in still other fields of law (e.g., securities law),
there seemed to be no obvious, or even nonobvious, convergence
(neither "perfect fit" nor "close enough").
It seemed possible, of course, that in the right circumstances,
any given piece of positive law (fraudulent concealment, resale
price maintenance) could, and did, become the site of political
struggle. But this contingent possibility did not seem sufficient to
support a claim that law is politics-at least not in any interesting
sense.
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That there were distributive stakes in the outcomes of
litigation also seemed clear. In a trivial sense, this is always true.
The problem was: Could it be seen as true in a more than trivial
sense? Were the goods distributed along recognizable political
lines or not? Sometimes yes. Sometimes sort of. Sometimes
seemingly not.
Given the endless mediations of law, the
hermeneutic clumsiness of regression analysis, and the difficulty of
even framing the 3right question, all of this seemed exceedingly
difficult to sort out.

Then there was the notion of law as politics in the sense of
academic cabals, inside tracks, old boys' clubs, the ingrown
reproduction of the academy, the race to place the clerks,
colonization of the academic provinces, and propagation of the
faith. For those legal academics who were busy trying to bring
about constitutional paradigm shifts through law review articles or
planning the future of the nation in footnotes, this vision of the
politics of law seemed startlingly underwhelming. But for many of
us, it did not: the sociology of the academy helped explain much
about the character and limitations of legal thought and legal
education. Still, apart from Kennedy's pioneering work (the little
red book) and Peter Gabel's overly enthusiastic endorsement of
"unalienated relatedness," this vision of politics also remained
underdeveloped.
Another vision of politics was this sort of old New Left notion
of taking up New Left political positions and trying to advance
them through grand normative arguments or legal theory. This
struck me, and still strikes me, as an unbelievably romanticized
project. But it clearly captured the imagination of many legal
academics: people wrote as if there were these great political
formations of left, center, and right, mobilized for struggle, just
waiting for the final touches on the normative instructions issuing
from the law schools.
Politics was also cast as a kind of vaguely Nietzschean
assertion of the will, or crypto-Heideggerian existentialist
resoluteness.
Again, this view of politics has remained
underelaborated. In fairness, of course, given that we are talking
about an ungrounded moment of existentialist commitment, it's
not clear that there is a whole lot more to be said on this score. I
do not mean this as criticism. On the contrary, this view of politics
is "a natural" for law. Legal dogmatics come clothed in the
language of rationality, good judgment, dialogue, etc., but there is
always that unredeemed moment of decision when the gavel
3

This difficulty was certainly not unique to cls.
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comes down: Law is as much the thought that shapes the act as the
act that shapes the thought.
Now, admittedly, much of my downplaying of the significance
of the cls "law is politics" claims stems from a bit of revisionist
history (in the pejorative sense of the term). In terms of the
American legal academy as a whole, even the more modest
versions of "law is politics" were not so modest when made in the
late '70s and early '80s. It is difficult today, in 2000, to conjure up
the prevailing form of consciousness that dominated the American
law schools of the '70s. But this much can be said: It was, by and
large, an article of faith that there were "objective" answers to
legal problems.
And whatever "objective" meant (still an
interesting question today), it did not mean (take my word for it)
"intersubjective validity." This was also a time when legal
academics talked about whether a case was "correctly decided,"
and, in turn, actually expected "the" correct answer to that
question. In that context, even the seemingly innocent notion that
a judicial decision might require a value choice could well have
seemed shocking. Indeed, much of what is taken for granted today
about the politics of law is probably a function of the efforts of cls
thinkers, even if the role accorded politics is far more
domesticated than what most of them had in mind.
II.

KENNEDY'S POLITICS

Amidst these various floating conceptions of politics, Duncan
Kennedy's earlier work seemed to simply presume the ontological
integrity of politics.
Whereas law was always riven with
contradiction and the self wrought in paradox, political
commitment always seemed uncommonly easy and uncannily
whole for Kennedy. In his work, political commitment typically
appeared early, up front, and in such a seemingly innocent way,
you might actually miss it.
Here's an example from the 1986 essay, Freedom and
Constraint in Adjudication: A Critical Phenomenology, in which
Kennedy describes what it is like to be a judge who wants to rule
in favor of striking workers who engage in a "lie-in," and against
whom management seeks an injunction.' Some thirty pages into
the article, Kennedy writes:
Throughout the discussion to this point, I have spoken as a judge
who knows how he wants to come out and is vigorously trying to
bring the law into accord. [Yes that is true.] It is now time to
4 See Duncan Kennedy, Freedom and Constraint in Adjudication: A Critical
Phenomenology, 36 J. LEGAL EDuC. 518, 548 (1986).
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critique the how-I-want-to-come-out pole of our duality ....
[Yes, this would be good.] First, however, let's reify it with an
acronym: HIWTCO. [What do you mean FIRST let's reify it?
WHAT are YOU talking about? It's been reified since page
TWO of the article! It's never been anything but a reification/f
And then the rest of the article is about how HIWTCO-this
political commitment-fares in a field of law. The discussion is
extremely interesting.
Judicial decision making appears as
successive reflective disequilibria.
But as Jeremy Paul
convincingly demonstrates, Kennedy's political commitment (i.e.,
HIWTCO) is underelaborated and underexplored; it just arrives
on the scene in a most decontextualized way-modified and
modifiable only as it is experienced within the resistances of law. 6
This was a simplified view of politics. It was simplified in the
sense that political commitment had already taken place (and all
the nonlegal considerations leading up to that commitment were
left offstage). In Critique, by contrast, Kennedy does problematize
the ontology of politics. Politics is identified as a struggle among
"ideological projects," variously described as conservatism,
liberalism, and leftism. Conservatism and liberalism are described
in terms of various commitments on isolated issues or issue
clusters (labor/capital, seller/consumer, status issues such as race,
gender, etc.).
The projects are given "substance" through
evocation of stereotypical stances on these issues. Kennedy
suggests that these projects are broadly recognizable to persons
participating in American political life. And, no doubt, most
readers would agree.
Even though we would agree (I certainly did), we should
resist this moment. In fact, Kennedy invites us to resist this
moment. If we read on, these ideological projects unravel. In fact,
the very idea of a project unravels. Read the wonderful passage
below. Experience its truth ("Yes, Kennedy is right."). Marvel at
the rhetoric ("But the man isn't saying anything that he isn't already
taking back.").
And then experience the irony ("Yes, the
description feels right, and it feels right precisely because there's
nothing there that is not already at once in fusion and also
unraveling."). So here's the passage:
The fudged notion of a project may be preferable to the more
precise terms paradigm, episteme, and conception, but it has its
difficulties. The idea is that a person entering American
political life finds it organized, loosely, into ideological
5 Id.

See Jeremy Paul, The Politics of Legal Semiotics, 69 TEx. L. REV. 1779, 1812-13
(1991).
6
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intelligentsias, which are self-conscious groups that identify with
particular interests, while proclaiming normative abstractions,
and which have, historically, worked for the adoption of specific
positions on issues that supposedly reflect both the interests and
the universal norms. An ideological project so conceived is not
reducible to .... '

Now, in an analytical mode, one wants to say, "Well, of course, the
man can make sense of everything in terms of ideology-the
category is so inclusive and so protean that there is nothing it cannot
explain." So, one could say this, but Kennedy is already there: "So
how can I use liberalism and conservatism as elements, as
conceptual tools for understanding adjudication, if my own view is
that each, when viewed as a 'philosophy,' is an internally
contradictory hodgepodge? 8 "Yes, exactly right: how can you do
that?" Now, this is a question he does not answer. Instead, he
offers some "stabilizers" to suggest how it is that conservatism and
liberalism might be recognizable as projects, despite their lack of
internal coherence:
Self-conscious consensus: it's liberal to come out a particular
way on a new issue if the liberals say it's liberal.
History: it's a liberal position if people who called themselves
liberal thought at some point in the past that it was entailed by
liberal premises.
Structural position vis-d-vis alternatives: it's liberal if it is
situated between a well-defined conservative position and an
equally well-defined Communist or anarchist position.
Local coherence: it's liberal if it is close to a lot of similar, welldefined liberal positions ....
Being a liberal, then, means thinking like the liberal next to you or
like liberals in the past or it means finding a Communist and a
conservative to sit between. Notice that this depiction of politics is
on the verge of satire. Being a liberal (or a conservative) in terms
of these stabilizers is not even ironic-it is self-parody. 10 The irony
only kicks in when you realize that the joke is real-lived out,
everyday. Again, the description resonates.
Now, the stabilizers do help make the ideologies recognizable.
But what these stabilizers do not do is render the ideologies
meaningful.
Given Kennedy's descriptions of the various
ideological projects, it's not clear why anyone would consciously

7 CRITIQUE, supra note 2, at 50.

Id.
9 Id. at 53 (emphases added).
10 Or maybe it's a parody of Karl Llewellyn's stabilizers. See KARL LLEWELLYN, THE
8

COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALs 521-35 (1960).
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choose to get behind liberalism or conservatism or leftism (or
indeed any other ideology).
Why do this? You would be swearing allegiance to some
project whose political or moral valence remains unknown to you.
You would be earnestly lining up eager to support or to fight
against an organized yet incoherent set of signs. At this point,
there is a critique from the traditional left:
Now look here. You, Duncan Kennedy, have left politics a
It turns out, in fact, that an
virtually empty category.
ideological "project" is a contradictory and self-consuming
Not surprisingly, your account renders
rhetorical space.
liberalism and conservatism rather shallow and circular as
political enterprises. And, as for leftism, to the extent it avoids
this unhappy prospect, it is only at the cost of being radically
underelaborated in the book. It survives if only as a series of ad
hoc commitments to context-specific issues and local politics.
But there is also a critique that issues from a more postmodern
quarter. It goes:
Look. You, Duncan Kennedy, have rid politics of its pretense
to a stabilizable identity. You have (rightly) put its character in
question. But then you nonetheless insist that we should be or
remain political-on pain of being in bad faith. But your own
critique-one that slides easily from law to politics-suggests
that it would be bad faith to trust in the categories of politics.
Everything you say about "rightness" in the law transposes to
the political. And at that point, there is no particular reason to
privilege the political. Those who would sign up for a political
project would seem to be as much in bad faith as those who sign
up for this or that version of the "correct" theory of law. In
fact, "signing up" seems to be itself the grammatical form of
bad faith.
So one could say this ... except that Kennedy has already said it:
Do not swear allegiance to a project."
So, to try again: how is adjudication ideological? The short
answer is that law is pervaded by the contests among various
ideological projects. Case law is the juridical residue of past
ideological struggles. Adjudication disposes of the distributive
stakes. The political character of law rests neither on the states of
mind of judges nor simply on the consequential effects. Rather, the
discourse of law, its texts, its determinations of the fields of legal
reasoning, bargaining, etc., are themselves ideologically marked.
All right. Except that not all areas of law are openly
politicized in terms of conventional "ideological projects." Sure,

11See CRrrIQUE, supra note 2, at 285-89.
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law is politics.., but there is a great deal of law that might be
more readily described in other (far less catchy) formulas: law is
accounting! Or, law is documentation!
Of course, some areas of law are transparently politicized:
these are the kinds of ideological disputes that Kennedy lays out as
examples of policy proposals by cls thinkers. I will split them into
two groups-earlier labeled "perfect fit" and "close enough." The
perfect fit group involves those areas of law in which the
substantive ideological disputes are almost directly translated in
law itself: the categories of ideology are the categories of law, i.e.,
labor law, race law, gender law, First Amendment law. The "close
enough" group involves those areas of law in which the
adjudicatory allocations of power among established governmental
actors have, as a historical matter, often tracked with, and often
affected, the political fortunes of recognizable ideological projects.
These include federalism, local government law, and public
international law.
But there are whole areas of law that are mapped out with an
ontology and a grammar that do not readily translate into any
easily recognizable ideology. The obvious answer, from a critical
perspective, is that the ideological stakes are there, but they have
been suppressed through repeated juridical acts of denial.
So what we have in these seemingly nonpoliticized areas of
law are juridical precincts where the politics have effectively been
expelled or domesticated. This may be right: as an historical
matter, it's certainly conceivable that an area of law once
politicized has become depoliticized-and, what's more,
depoliticized through the work of adjudication.12 Once we move
away from the historical perspective to a description of
contemporary law, then some difficulties of a descriptive as well as
strategic character emerge. Kennedy asks us to see that law is at
once a contradictory product of ideology and denial of the
ideological. 11
III. DENIAL
As a kind of description of law, this sort of "contradiction
account" has a certain appeal. It has some advantages over those
12 For an early example of this sort of claim, see Karl Klare, Judicial Deradicalization
of the Wagner Act and the Origins of Modern Legal Consciousness, 1937-41, 62 MINN. L.
REV. 265 (1978).
13 In Critique, "denial" functions as an explanatory or elucidating device.
More
importantly, perhaps "denial" is the key site for political activity: denial of the ideological
stakes is the demon to be rooted out. See Gary Minda, Denial. Not Just a River in Egypt,

22 CARDOZO L. REV. 901 (2001).
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legal theories that strive for maximum coherence or integrity. The
latter (Dworkin's work comes to mind) achieve coherence by
expelling any impurities from law that could controvert or upset
the theory. "Coherence accounts" depend upon a jurisprudential
cleansing of the field in the drive to achieve a perfect monism-the
grand overarching theory. If the monistic aesthetic were merely
conceptual, it might be pleasing: Mondrian jurisprudence. But
inasmuch as the cleansing of the conceptual field corresponds to
the cleansing of the material and social identities in the field, there
is reason for pause. Monism can have a nice face (compassionate
monism?), but when one considers its social and material
implications (namely, just who or what gets erased), it's not so nice
anymore.
But Kennedy's contradiction account has certain problems as
well. One problem, of course, is that the structure of the
explanation is overly accommodating. Given denial, one can say
that law is at once X and the denial of X. When someone says,
"What are you talking about, law isn't X!" the response is: "You're
in denial."
Kennedy does not limit his account of denial to the individual
legal professional. On the contrary, an important aspect of his
work, dating all the way back to The Structure of Blackstone's
Commentaries,4 is that law is, in part, a discourse of denial. In
other words, denial is built into legal doctrine, theory, etc. The
difficult question is: What happens when denial-at the level of
legal discourse-has been successful at purging ideology from a
certain area of law? This would seem to matter not simply from a
conceptual standpoint (just what is it that Kennedy is saying
here?) but also from a political standpoint (if there is no trace left
of the political in a particular area of law, then what's the point in
calling that law political?). This comes dangerously close to
saying: This is a political matter-it's just that the politics have
been completely taken out of it.
It turns out then that, just as the coherence accounts can lapse
into an overly facile form of analysis, so too can contradiction
accounts. The coherence explanations defuse conflicting accounts
through expulsion ("law works itself pure"). The contradiction
accounts defuse nonconforming data by relegating them to an
ethically unflattering realm labeled "denial."' 5

14 Duncan Kennedy, The Structure of Blackstone's Commentaries, 28 BuFF. L. REV.
205 (1979).
15 As Jeremy Paul pointed out at the conference, psychological literature indicates that
denial is not necessarily something to be avoided. It is, in part, an adaptive mechanism.
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Within coherence or contradiction accounts, there's no a
priori way to eliminate these kinds of problems. The redemption
of either kind of account (coherence or contradiction) is a function
of its plausibility. Either kind of account can seem more or less
plausible, interesting, or useful in light of the way in which it
organizes, describes, and valorizes matters that are thought to be
important.
Important to whom? The value of either kind of account
seems to be a function of the subject-his or her cognitive,
psychological, or political interests.
My preference, like Kennedy's, is for contradiction accounts.
This is based in part on the contingent fact that the overwhelming
majority of legal academics seem bent on representing law as a
coherent and rational enterprise. In this context, it would seem
helpful to have at least a few people exploring law from a less
juridically exalted angle. But, mostly, my preference stems from
an aesthetic judgment: much of the time, I simply do not
experience law as a coherent enterprise, though an important
aspect of the enterprise is the representation of law as coherent. 6
It might seem that this acknowledgment of the importance of
aesthetics to contradiction accounts gives a distinct advantage to
coherence accounts that claim to be conceptual in nature. But that
doesn't follow at all. The view of law as coherent, rational, and
integrated is also informed by a certain aesthetic experience. The
point here is that whether one sees law as contradicted or
So denial, in and of itself is neither here nor there. It's a parasitic concept-and its ethical
or political valence depends on the identity of its object, context or source.
In terms of the Self: Sometimes denial is an adaptive mechanism-a way of
warding off threats to the self, and that is a good thing. Sometimes, denial is a
way of avoiding confrontations that need to be resolved, and that is a bad thing.
In terms of Personal Ethics: Sometimes denial precludes facing up to ethical or
political choices, and is thus wrong. Sometimes, denial is a way to mobilize the
self for resolute action, and is thus a good thing.
In terms of Aesthetics: Sometimes denial precludes the self from experiencing a
broad range of phenomena, and thus yields a narrow self capable of only small
thoughts and small actions, which is a bad thing. Sometimes denial restricts
experience so as to ward off injurious influences that might lead to personality
disintegration, which is a good thing.
In terms of Politics: Sometimes denial enables work or struggle against strong
odds, which is a good thing. Sometimes denial keeps people working at useless
tasks, which is a bad thing.
The juxtaposition of these propositions yields, at this level of abstraction, an
undecidability about the virtues and vices of denial. But there is more. In the
propositions above, it is quite possible, and in some contexts will be appropriate or
desirable, to reverse the valences-so that the "and that is a good thing" becomes "and
that is a bad thing," and vice versa.
16 See PIERRE SCHLAG, THE AESTHETICS OF AMERICAN LAW (forthcoming 2001). A
lot of that, of course, has to do with the identity of that three letter word, "law"-but
that's neither here nor there.
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coherent, and whether one sees argument as denial or justification,
both depend on an aesthetic experience of law. That is not to say
that one's view cannot change. Quite the contrary. But change
will not require arguing one's way through complex conceptual
arguments as much as it will require training the self to see and
experience the law in a different way. 7

17

See id.

